Douglas Dion, “Competition and Ethnic Conflict: Artifactual?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 5 (1997): 647. Note, as well, that the violence of interstate wars is never referred to as “ethnic violence,” even when the nation–states involved are composed of populations with distinct ethnic identities.
62. F. A. Voigt, The Greek Sedition (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), 75.
63. Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 426.
64. “That political violence can be ethnic is well established, indeed too well established; how it is ethnic remains obscure . . . Sustained attention needs to be paid to the forms and dynamics of ethnicization, to the many and subtle ways in which violence—
and conditions, processes, activities, and narratives linked to violence—can take on ethnic hues.” See Brubaker and Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” 427.
65. A possible testable formulation is as follows: the deeper the divisions, the more violent the resulting civil war. Kalyvas finds that prewar polarization in Greece, as measured by prewar electoral returns, does not predict levels of violence during the civil war, as measured by homicide rates, controlling for a host of other factors. See Stathis N.
Kalyvas, “Incorporating Constructivist Propositions into Theories of Civil War” (unpublished paper, 2005).
66. Brubaker and Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” 426.
67. David D. Laitin, “Secessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 8 (2001): 839-61.
68. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-86. The issue has not been settled yet. See J. G.
Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War,”
American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 796-816; and Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Jan Ketil Rod, “Modeling Conflict in Center-Periphery Dyads” (unpublished paper, 2006).
69. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 860.
70. Roy Licklider, “Early Returns: Results of the First Wave of Statistical Studies of Civil War Termination,” Civil Wars 1, no. 3 (1998): 126-27.
71. Quoted in Roger Dupuy, Les Chouans (Paris: Hachette, 1997), 237.
72. The actual micromechanisms of victimization may vary to include anything from goal-oriented action at the mass level (elimination, secession) to emotions (hatred, dehu-manization), symbols and rituals, and goal-oriented action at the individual level (private profit, criminality).
73. Raymond Boudon, “The Logic of Relative Frustration,” in Rationality and Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 245-67.
74. Dion, “Competition and Ethnic Conflict.”
75. Deborah Bennett, Randomness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3.
76. Patricia Griffin, The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counterrevolutionaries: 1924-1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 144.
77. Ibid., 34. Note that a person’s behavior may not necessarily be predicted by her status.
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78. Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Steven David, “Internal War: Causes and Cures,” World Politics 49, no. 4 (1997): 552-76.
79. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War; David Laitin, “National Revivals and Violence,” European Journal of Sociology 36 (1995): 3-43.
80. Timur Kuran, “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution,” Public Choice 61, no. 1 (1989): 41-74; Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).