Let us
change the object, as oft as we please; provided still we choose one, that
has neither of these two relations. Let us repeat the experiment in all the
dispositions, of which the mind is susceptible. No object, in the vast
variety of nature, will, in any disposition, produce any passion without
these relations.
Second Experiment. Since an object, that wants both these relations can
never produce any passion, let us bestow on it only one of these relations;
and see what will follow. Thus suppose, I regard a stone or any common
object, that belongs either to me or my companion, and by that means
acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: Tis plain, that to
consider the matter a priori, no emotion of any kind can reasonably be
expected. For besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly
on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions
of pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to
ourselves or others; which opposition of the passions must destroy both,
and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion. This
reasoning a priori is confirm'd by experience. No trivial or vulgar object,
that causes not a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion, will ever,
by its property or other relations either to ourselves or others, be able to
produce the affections of pride or humility, love or hatred.
Third Experiment. `Tis evident, therefore, that a relation of ideas is not
able alone to give rise to these affections. Let us now remove this
relation, and in its stead place a relation of impressions, by presenting an
object, which is agreeable or disagreeable, but has no relation either to
ourself or companion; and let us observe the consequences. To consider
the matter first a priori, as in the preceding experiment; we may
conclude, that the object will have a small, but an uncertain connexion
with these passions. For besides, that this relation is not a cold and
imperceptible one, it has not the inconvenience of the relation of ideas,
nor directs us with equal force to two contrary passions, which by their
opposition destroy each other. But if we consider, on the other hand, that
this transition from the sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any
principle, that produces a transition of ideas; but, on the contrary, that
tho' the one impression be easily transfus'd into the other, yet the change
of objects is suppos'd contrary to all the principles, that cause a transition
of that kind; we may from thence infer, that nothing will ever be a steady
or durable cause of any passion, that is connected with the passion
merely by a relation of impressions. What our reason wou'd conclude
from analogy, after balancing these arguments, wou'd be, that an object,
which produces pleasure or uneasiness, but has no manner of connexion
either with ourselves or others, may give such a turn to the disposition,
as that may naturally fall into pride or love, humility or hatred, and
search for other objects, upon which by a double relation, it can found
these affections; but that an object, which has only one of these relations,
tho' the most advantageous one, can never give rise to any constant and
establish'd passion.
Most fortunately all this reasoning is found to be exactly conformable to
experience, and the phaenomena of the passions.' Suppose I were
travelling with a companion thro' a country, to which we are both utter
strangers; `tis evident, that if the prospects be beautiful, the roads
agreeable, and the inns commodious, this may put me into good humour
both with myself and fellow-traveller. But as we suppose, that this
country has no relation either to myself or friend. it can never be the
immediate cause of pride or love; and therefore if I found not the passion
on some other object, that bears either of us a closer relation, my
emotions are rather to be considerd as the overflowings of an elevate or
humane disposition, than as an establish'd passion. The case is the same
where the object produces uneasiness.
Fourth Experiment. Having found, that neither an object without any
relation of ideas or impressions, nor an object, that has only one relation,
can ever cause pride or humility, love or hatred; reason alone may
convince us, without any farther experiment, that whatever has a double
relation must necessarily excite these passions; sincètis evident they
must have some cause. But to leave as little room for doubt as possible,
let us renew our experiments, and see whether the event in this case
answers our expectation. I choose an object, such as virtue, that causes a
separate satisfaction: On this object I bestow a relation to self; and find,
that from this disposition of affairs, there immediately arises a passion.
But what passion? That very one of pride, to which this object bears a
double relation. Its idea is related to that of self, the object of the passion:
The sensation it causes resembles the sensation of the passion. That I
may be sure I am not mistaken in this experiment, I remove first one
relation; then another; and find, that each removal destroys the passion,
and leaves the object perfectly indifferent. But I am not content with this.
I make a still farther trial; and instead of removing the relation, I only
change it for one of a different kind. I suppose the virtue to belong to my
companion, not to myself; and observe what follows from this alteration.
I immediately perceive the affections wheel to about, and leaving pride,
where there is only one relation, viz, of impressions, fall to the side of
love, where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions and
ideas. By repeating the same experiment, in changing anew the relation
of ideas, I bring the affections back to pride; and by a new repetition I
again place them at love or kindness. Being fully convinc'd of the
influence of this relation, I try the effects of the other; and by changing
virtue for vice, convert the pleasant impression, which arises from the
former, into the disagreeable one, which proceeds from the latter. The
effect still answers expectation. Vice, when plac'd on another, excites, by
means of its double relations, the passion of hatred, instead of love,
which for the same reason arises from virtue. To continue the
experiment, I change anew the relation of ideas, and suppose the vice to
belong to myself. What follows? What is usual. A subsequent change of
the passion from hatred to humility. This humility I convert into pride by
a new change of the impression; and find after all that I have compleated
the round, and have by these changes brought back the passion to that
very situation, in which I first found it.