The same custom goes beyond the instances, from which it is
deriv'd, and to which it perfectly corresponds; and influences his ideas of
such objects as are in some respect resembling, but fall not precisely
under the same rule. The circumstances of depth and descent strike so
strongly upon him, that their influence can-not be destroy'd by the
contrary circumstances of support and solidity, which ought to give him
a perfect security. His imagination runs away with its object, and excites
a passion proportion'd to it. That passion returns back upon the
imagination and inlivens the idea; which lively idea has a new influence
on the passion, and in its turn augments its force and violence; and both
his fancy and affections, thus mutually supporting each other, cause the
whole to have a very great influence upon him.
But why need we seek for other instances, while the present subject of
philosophical probabilities offers us so obvious an one, in the opposition
betwixt the judgment and imagination arising from these effects of
custom? According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the
effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by inlivening the
imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object. It may,
therefore, be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be
contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a
manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This difficulty we can
remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of
general rules. We shall afterwards take(23) notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects;
and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on
our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning
objects. By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances
from the efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be
produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we
conclude that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious
cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it. But as this frequent
conjunction necessity makes it have some effect on the imagination, in
spite of the opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposition of
these two principles produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes
us to ascribe the one inference to our judgment, and the other to our
imagination. The general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being
more extensive and constant. The exception to the imagination, as being
more capricious and uncertain.
Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other.
When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable
circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception
of the usual effect, Tho' the object be different in the most material and
most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first
influence of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the
mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of
the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive
of all the most established principles of reasonings; which is the cause of
our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies
the condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the
other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person.
The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the
second. Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing
a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all
philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and
again sav'd by a new direction of the very same principle. The following
of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet
'tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other
unphilosophical probabilities.
Since we have instances, where general rules operate on the imagination
even contrary to the judgment, we need not be surpriz'd to see their
effects encrease, when conjoin'd with that latter faculty, and to observe
that they bestow on the ideas they present to us a force superior to what
attends any other. Every one knows, there is an indirect manner of
insinuating praise or blame, which is much less shocking than the open
flattery or censure of any person. However be may communicate his
sentiments by such secret insinuations, and make them known with
equal certainty as by the open discovery of them, 'tis certain that their
influence is not equally strong and powerful. One who lashes me with
conceal'd strokes of satire, moves not my indignation to such a degree, as
if he flatly told me I was a fool and coxcomb; tho' I equally understand
his meaning, as if he did. This difference is to be attributed to the
influence of general rules.
Whether a person openly, abuses me, or slyly intimates his contempt, in
neither case do I immediately perceive his sentiment or opinion; and 'tis
only by signs, that is, by its effects, I become sensible of it. The only
difference, then, betwixt these two cases consists in this, that in the open
discovery of his sentiments he makes use of signs, which are general and
universal; and in the secret intimation employs such as are more
singular and uncommon. The effect of this circumstance is, that the
imagination, in running from the present impression to the absent idea,
makes the transition with greater facility, and consequently conceives the
object with greater force, where the connexion is common and universal,
than where it is more rare and particular. Accordingly we may observe,
that the open declaration of our sentiments is call'd the taking off the
mask, as the secret intimation of our opinions is said to be the veiling of
them. The difference betwixt an idea produc'd by a general connexion,
and that arising from a particular one is here compar'd to the difference
betwixt an impression and an idea. This difference in the imagination
has a suitable effect on the passions; and this effect is augmented by
another circumstance. A secret intimation of anger or contempt shews
that we still have some consideration for the person, and avoid the
directly abusing him. This makes a conceal'd satire less disagreeable; but
still this depends on the same principle. For if an idea were not more
feeble, when only intimated, it wou'd never be esteem'd a mark of greater
respect to proceed in this method than in the other.
Sometimes scurrility is less displeasing than delicate satire, because it
revenges us in a manner for the injury at the very time it is committed,